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I. INTRODUCTION
Today the economy throughout the Midwestern states is generally
very depressed. Not only is the situation headlined by farm failures,'
but a large percentage of non-farm businesses are also faced with se-
vere financial difficulties.2 Unfortunately, during these times lenders
are often forced to resort to foreclosing upon the property of delin-
quent debtors.3 Many debtors, on the other hand, in order to avoid
complete financial obliteration are forced to seek relief under the
1. See Baily & Hill, As Many Farms Fail, More Rural Banks are at Risk of Dying,
Too, Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1985, at 1, col. 6; see also Farnsworth, U.S. Farm Debt
Report Disputes Reagan Figures, N.Y. Times, March 11, 1985, at A15, col. 1 (high-
lighting a recent study by the U.S. Agricultural Department which shows one-
third of family farms face financial difficulty, 13.7% of such farms being close to
insolvent).
2. See Wall St. J., Nov. 21,1985, at 1, col. 5 (highlighting a study of rural banks which
predicted that 20 to 25% of "Main Street" businesses could close in the next two
years because of the domino effect of the poor agricultural economy).
3. See Wall St. J., Feb. 18,1986, at 29, col. 3 (claims paid by private mortgage insurers
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bankruptcy laws.4
The Nebraska Legislature has statutorily provided lenders two
common devices for securing real estate loans, the mortgage and the
deed of trust.5 These security devices and the corresponding proce-
dures used to foreclose the interests of the debtor are by no means
new to the lending industry or the real estate practice. However, the
usual foreclosure sale, which is typically conducted on the courthouse
steps, very seldom attracts attention from sincerely interested pur-
chasers. Instead the sale sports an entourage of curious bystanders
and onlookers as well as one bidder, that bidder usually being the
lender that initiated the action to foreclose the debtor's interest. It is
usually under these circumstances that the property is sold for the
amount of a single bid, that bid being submitted by the foreclosing
lender.6
The debtor, if in attendance, is usually resigned to watching as the
property is sold for a price he may consider to be well below the fair
in 1985 are nearly twelve times the amount paid out in 1980, thus representing an
increasing number of foreclosures nationwide).
4. The Office of the Clerk of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the District of Nebraska,
indicates that the filing of bankruptcy petitions has increased substantially the
past two years; 2,205 petitions were filed in 1983, as compared with 2,547 petitions
in 1984, and 3,016 petitions in 1985. Telephone interview with the Office of the
Clerk of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the District of Nebraska (Feb. 8, 1986).
5. The statutory provisions relating to deeds of trust are found at NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 76-1001 to 76-1018 (1981). The general provisions relating to recordation of
mortgages are found at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-238.01 to 76-239.01 (1981). General
provisions relating to judicial foreclosure of mortgages and deeds of trust can be
found at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2137 to 25-2155 (1985).
A real estate mortgage can be defined as a transfer by a debtor of an interest
in real property to a creditor for purposes of providing security for the perform-
ance of an obligation, usually the payment of a note. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN,
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 1 (2d ed. 1985). A deed of trust involves the debtor's
conveyance of the real estate to a third person (trustee) who holds the property
as security for the payment of a debt to a lender. Id. at 11-12. An indepth analysis
of these two common forms of security devices and the associated procedures for
foreclosure is beyond the scope of this Article.
For a broad view of Nebraska practices, see Comment, In Deed an Alternative
Security Device: The Nebraska Trust Deeds Acts, 64 NEB. L. REV. 92 (1985); McC-
lymont & Thompson, The Nebraska Trust Deeds Act: Coming Out of the Closet, 1
NEB. REAL EST. L. J. 49 (1983); Reno, Mortgage Foreclosures in Nebraska, NEB.
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. SEMINAR ON REAL EST. LAW AND CONVEYANCES
(1977).
It should be noted that under Nebraska law, other forms of remedies may be
available to a lender having a secured interest in real property of the debtor.
These remedies may include an action in ejectment, an action in strict foreclo-
sure, or an action to quiet title. These remedies, however, are very limited. For a
brief discussion of these actions, see Tye, Creditor Remedies Under Land Con-
tracts and Mortgages, NEB. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. SEMINAR ON REAL ESTATE
LAw (1983).
6. In most cases, the bid price submitted by a foreclosing lender will be equivalent to
the exact amount necessary to liquidate the indebtedness secured by the mort-
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market value of the property. Usually the debtor's attempts to salvage
the property by refinancing or seeking new credit sources will have
failed.7 In a non-judicial foreclosure, such as a trustee's sale, the suc-
cessful purchaser will immediately receive title to the subject property
upon payment of the sale price. In a judicially supervised sale, the sale
may have to be confirmed by the court. Even this is not significant
solace to the debtor, since the sale will usually be confirmed as a mat-
ter of course, without a full evidentiary hearing.
In light of this scenario, which is in no respect limited to the Mid-
western states, but is repeatedly seen nationwide, some federal courts
have applied principles developed in bankruptcy law concerning
fraudulent conveyances to invalidate and avoid certain foreclosure
sales conducted within one year of the date of the debtor's subsequent
filing of a petition in bankruptcy. In so doing, these decisions have
ignited a raging controversy regarding the application of fraudulent
conveyance law to the foreclosure process. While the courts wrestle
with the problems of statutory interpretation, other policy considera-
tions abound. These include the desire to have certainty in real estate
titles, the resulting effects on the cost and availability of credit secured
by real estate loans, as well as the principles of equitable distribution
found in the bankruptcy laws.
This Article reviews the applicable federal bankruptcy statutes
gage or deed of trust. This is usually the situation if the property's fair market
value equals or exceeds the outstanding indebtedness.
There are other situations in which the lender may submit a lower bid, so as to
retain the right to seek a deficiency judgment against the debtor. Under Ne-
braska law regarding deeds of trust, a lender may never acquire a deficiency judg-
ment for greater than the difference between the outstanding indebtedness under
the deed of trust and the fair market value, regardless of a bid price which may be
below fair market value. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1013 (1981).
7. For purposes of this discussion, it will be assumed that the debtor has not filed a
petition in bankruptcy prior to the foreclosure sale. A debtor may be able to
obtain a stay of the foreclosure sale under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (Supp. II 1984), by
filing a petition in bankruptcy prior to the sale.
The issue considered in this Article arises when the debtor has allowed a fore-
closure sale to be completed, and has subsequently filed a petition in bankruptcy.
The argument will then be raised as to whether the "pre-petition foreclosure
sale" should be avoided under fraudulent transfer provisions of the bankruptcy
laws.
There are potentially two reasons why a debtor in possession or a trustee in
bankruptcy may attempt to avoid a foreclosure sale. First, in a reorganization
case, the debtor may regain some equity which was lost through the foreclosure
sale, thereby increasing the possibility of a successful workout. Secondly, even in
a liquidation case, a bankruptcy sale may achieve a higher sale price than would a
foreclosure sale. See LaPucld, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State
Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 Wisc. L. Rev. 311, 321 n.52 (1982) (without
citing empirical studies the commentator reaches this conclusion, based on the
fact that under the Bankruptcy Act § 110(f) (1976), the sale of property for less
than 75% of value was prohibited).
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pertinent to this controversy, and examines the development of case
law and the historical evolution of fraudulent conveyance law. Sec-
ondly, this Article explores the policy implications involved in avoid-
ing foreclosure sales and demonstrates the ease with which certain
foreclosure procedures might be reformed.
II. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER PROVISIONS OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
The Bankruptcy Code,8 like its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act9
contains two provisions regarding fraudulent conveyances.10 The first
provision, section 544(b)1- provides the trustee the power to avoid any
transfer by the debtor which would be voidable for any reason, includ-
ing fraud, under applicable state or federal law.12 While section 544(b)
is an important provision, the discussion and controversy reflected in
this Article focuses on the second provision, section 548.13
Section 548 is the focal point of recent controversy regarding the
use of the Bankruptcy Code to avoid certain pre-petition foreclosures
sales. Section 548(a) provides:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in prop-
erty, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or
within one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor vol-
untarily or involuntarily -
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on
or after the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred,
indebted; or
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for such transfer or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or
8. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1329 (Supp. II 1984). The "Code" was established by the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), and was subse-
quently amended by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs (98 Stat.) 333 (1984)
[hereinafter "Code" or "Bankruptcy Code"]. All section references herein will
refer to the Code, unless otherwise indicated.
9. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978) (codified in 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1-1103 (1976)) [hereinafter referred to as the "Act" or "Bankruptcy Act"]. The
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was amended several times, including a major revision in
1938, by the Chandler Act Amendments of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 [hereinafter
Chandler Act].
10. For purposes of this Article, the terms "fraudulent conveyance" and "fraudulent
transfer" will be equated. Historically and up until the mid-1900s, the term
"fraudulent conveyance" was standardly used. However, more recently the term
"fraudulent transfer" has been preferred.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (Supp. II 1984).
12. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 544.03 (15th ed. 1985). In order to assert such a
claim, the trustee is compelled to stand on the rights of actual unsecured creditor
of the debtor, against whom the transfer was voidable. Id.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1983 & Supp. II 1984).
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such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer
or obligation;
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to en-
gage in business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the
debtor was an unreasonably small capital; or
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur,
debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts
matured.1
4
Some of the early decisions which invalidated certain pre-petition
foreclosure sales on fraudulent transfer grounds were decided under
section 67(d) of the Chandler Act.15 Although the drafters of the
Code made stylistic changes to the Chandler Act, few substantive
changes were made with respect to fraudulent conveyances.16
Legislative history reveals that the commission created by Con-
gress to recommend changes in the bankruptcy law, recommended no
substantial changes to section 67(d) of the Chandler Act except to sim-
plify the provision's language. 17 Since few substantive changes oc-
curred with respect to the fraudulent conveyance provisions, the
analysis employed by the courts in invalidating pre-petition foreclo-
sure sales under section 67(d) of the Chandler Act would be compara-
14. Id § 548(a).
15. Section 67(d)(2) of the Chandler Act provides:
Every transfer made and every obligation incurred by a debtor within
one year prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy or of an original
petition under chapter X, XI, XII, or XIII of this Act by or against him is
fraudulent (a) as to creditors existing at the time of such transfer or obli-
gation, if made or incurred without fair consideration by a debtor who is
or will be thereby rendered insolvent, without regard to his actual in-
tent; or (b) as to then existing creditors and as to other persons who
become creditors during the continuance of a business or transaction, if
made or incurred without fair consideration by a debtor who is engaged
or is about to engage in such business or transaction, for which the prop-
erty remaining in his hands is an unreasonably small capital, without
regard to his actual intent; or (c) as to then existing and future creditors,
if made or incurred without fair consideration by a debtor who intends to
incur or believes that he will incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they
mature; or (d) as to then existing and future creditors, if made or in-
curred with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law,
to hinder, delay or defraud either existing or future creditors.
Chandler Act Amendments of 1938, ch. 575, § 67(d)(2) 52 Stat. 840, 877 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. 107(d)(2) (1976) (repealed 1978)).
16. H. MILLER & M. COOK, A PRAcTIcAL GUIDE To THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT,
340 (Supp. 1985). One change pertinent to this discussion is the Code's elimina-
tion of the "good faith" requirement with respect to transferees. See infra notes
135-37 and accompanying text.
17. The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States was established by
Congress to recommend changes in the bankruptcy laws. The Commission re-
ported that "Section 67d is modeled upon the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances
Act. The Commission believes that it has worked satisfactorily and it does not
recommend any substantial changes therein, except a simplification of its ex-
tremely complex language." REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1973).
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ble to a court's analysis under the Code.18
Courts which have invalidated pre-petition foreclosure sales have
utilized the language contained specifically in section 548(a)(2)(A) and
(B)(1),19 which provides for avoidance of a transfer if the transfer was
"constructively" fraudulent.20 Section 548(a)(1) provides for the
avoidance of any transfer which the debtor made with "actual intent
to hinder, delay or defraud" a creditor. In most cases where a foreclos-
ing creditor seeks to enforce its rights under a mortgage or deed of
trust, the debtor has no actual intent to defraud other creditors be-
cause of the foreclosing creditor's actions. Therefore, actions by trust-
ees to avoid pre-petition foreclosure sales have been brought under
section 548(a)(2) (A) and (B)(1), where the transfer is considered "con-
structively fraudulent," without regard to any intent on the part of the
debtor.21
The elements of a fraudulent transfer are set out in section
548(a)(2)(A) and (B)(i) of the Code. Those elements include:
(1) a transfer by the debtor,22
(2) within one year prior to the debtor filing a petition in
bankruptcy,2 3
(3) for less than reasonably equivalent value,24
(4) while the debtor was insolvent, or became insolvent due to the
said transfer.25
Two of these four elements have created the controversy in court
decisions. The concepts of "transfer" and "reasonably equivalent
value" have been interpreted and applied in different ways by the
courts, ultimately leading to conflicting conclusions as to whether the
fraudulent transfer provisions of the Bankruptcy Code can be used as
a tool to invalidate pre-petition foreclosure sales.2 6
18. See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1983 & Supp. II 1984).
20. For a fuller discussion see infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
21. Normally the creditor-debtor relationship in the foreclosure process will be an
adversarial one. While the debtor will be struggling to salvage his interest in the
real property, the creditor will be attempting to foreclosure and terminate the
debtor's interests. Only in a rare case when the debtor and creditor would act
collusively would there by any possible way for the trustee to argue that the pre-
petition foreclosure should be avoided under Code § 548(a)(1). For additional dis-
cussion concerning actual intent see infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1983 & Supp. II 1984).
23. Id.
24. Id § 548(a)(2)(A).
25. Id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i).
26. The other two elements listed, the debtor's insolvency and the one year avoidance
period, have not been at the heart of the dispute. This Article, therefore, devotes
little discussion to these two elements.
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III. THE HISTORY OF FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
Fraudulent conveyance laws have been in existence for several
centuries, 27 and apparently have been traced back at least two thou-
sand years to the Roman Empire.28 Throughout the centuries, several
decisions at common law and codifications thereof have emphasized
the same principle-protection of the creditor defrauded by a debtor.29
While its history can be traced back to antiquity,30 the most important
codification with respect to the formulation of American fraudulent
conveyance laws was the Statute of Elizabeth,31 enacted by the Eng-
lish Parliament in 1571. It is in this English codification that the mod-
ern day American law of fraudulent conveyances finds a solid
foundation.32
Fraudulent conveyance laws developed in England in an attempt to
curb the abuses by debtors of certain "sanctuary laws."33 A deceitful
debtor, upon realizing the hopelessness of his particular predicament,
would transfer property to friends and relatives, and take refuge in a
sanctuary which was outside the reach of creditors, while still en-
27. One commentator surmises that defaulting debtors are probably as old as the in-
stitution of property, that institution being almost as old as human society itself.
Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances in California and the Uniform Fraudulent Con-
veyance Act, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1 (1938).
28. The fraudulent debtor was evidently present in early Roman Law, since a tort
action, known as a "Paulian action" was available to a creditor who had been
defrauded by an insolvent debtor. The underlying theory of the right of the cred-
itor to recover was not on any interest the creditor had, but rather the public's
benefit by facilitating the payment of debts. M. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF RoMAN
LAW 15 (1923); Radin, supra note 27, at 1.
29. One general codification of Roman law regarding fraudulent conveyance can be
found in the INsTTruTEs OF JUSrINIAN, 284, Bk. 4, tit. 6, no. 6 (J. Thomas trans.
1975).
Then again, if someone deliver his property to another in fraud of his
creditors, the latter, on taking possession of his estate by the decision of
the provincial governor, can claim the thing, the delivery being nullified;
i.e., they are allowed to say that the thing was not delivered and, conse-
quently, remained the property of the debtor.
Id. This statement, however, was probably one of the later statements about Ro-
man law. Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances at Roman Law, 18 VA. L. REV. 109, 109
(1931). The Institutes of Justinian were published with the force of law and be-
came effective at the end of December, 533 A.D. J. THOMAS, TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN
LAW 57 (1976).
30. It seems quite apparent that Roman terminology regarding fraudulent convey-
ances was regularly used by the English draftsmen. 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 58 (1940).
31. 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570) (repealed by the Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5 ch. 20,
§ 172).
32. 0. BUMP, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 10 (1882); 1 G. GLENN, supra note 30, at
§ 58.
33. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 30, at § 61.
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joying a fairly comfortable lifestyle.34 Statutes passed in 137635 and
1487,36respectively, allowed creditors to execute upon property collu-
sively conveyed by the debtor and to avoid fraudulent gifts of personal
property made in trust by the debtor. The enactment of the Statute of
Elizabeth has been described by some to have been merely a codifica-
tion of the common law at that time.3 7
Aided by judicial interpretation, 38 the Statute of Elizabeth became
a powerful piece of legislation in the protection of creditors who had
been defrauded by debtors. Within only a few decades, the English
Parliament incorporated fraudulent conveyance provisions, as set out
in the Statute Elizabeth, into England's bankruptcy laws.39
In the United States, Congress was not oblivious to the plight of
the defrauded creditor. In 1800, upon adoption of the first bankruptcy
laws for the new nation, a fraudulent conveyance provision was in-
cluded within the law.40 Since that time, every subsequent bank-
ruptcy law enacted by Congress 41 has contained some form of
fraudulent conveyance provision. In 1898, upon adoption of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, the Congress continued to retain the principles and much
of the language set out in the Statute of Elizabeth.42
During the 1800s and early 1900s, the courts faced problems in ap-
plying fraudulent conveyance law to particular sets of circum-
34. Treman, Escaping the Creditor in the Middle Ages, 43 LAW Q. REV. 230, 235-36
(1927).
35. 50 Edw. 3, ch. 6 (1376).
36. 3 Hen. 7, ch. 4 (1487).
37. See Upton v. Bassett, 3 Co. 80, 83, 78 Eng. Rep. 685; Ryall v. Rolle, 1 Atk. 165, 26
Eng. Rep. 107 (1749); Hamilton v. Russel, 1 Cranch 309, 316 (1803); Hudnal v.
Wilder, 4 McCord 294, 7 S.C. 111 (1827). See also M. BIGELOW, THE LAW OF
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 12 (1911); 1 G. GLENN, supra note 30, at § 61.
38. In one of the most famous cases regarding the Statute of Elizabeth, Twynes Case,
3 Co. Rep. 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601), Coke showed that the notion of a fraudu-
lent conveyance was not limited to those debtors who sought sanctuary.
It is interesting to note that the Statute of Elizabeth was initially passed as a
penal law. The crown was entitled to one half of the property involved if the
conveyance was indeed determined to be fraudulent. However courts sidestepped
this provision by ignoring the fraudulent conveyance and merely allowing the
creditor to levy execution on the property involved. See Mannocke's Case, 3 Dy.
294b, 73 Eng. Rep. 661 (1571). See also 1 G. GLENN, supra note 30, at § 61(d).
39. See 1 Jac., ch. 15 (1603); see also 1 G. GLENN, supra note 30, at § 61(c).
40. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 17, 2 Stat. 19, 26 (repealed 1803).
41. During the course of the nation's history, five separate sets of bankruptcy laws
have been in force:
(1) Bankruptcy Act of 1800, id.;
(2) Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843);
(3) Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878);
(4) Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978);
(5) Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
42. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, at § 548.01.
[Vol. 66:383
FORECLOSURE SALES
stances.43 One of the most formidable problems implicitly embedded
in the law at that time was the difficulty of proving that the actual
intent of the debtor was to defraud his creditors. Many times the
debtor's intentions could not be clearly ascertained, but instead were
veiled in a cloak of darkness. 44 Creditors found it difficult to establish
sufficient evidence regarding the debtor's actual intent and accord-
ingly, the courts were forced to rely on instinct. In facing this repeti-
tion of particular fact patterns some courts chose to rely on
presumptions or "badges of fraud." Certain actions by the debtor were
found to be presumptively indicative of fraudulent intent.45 Under
this approach, case decisions were inconsistent, thereby creating pres-
sure for uniformity in fraudulent conveyance law.
In 1915, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws directed its Committee on Commercial Law to draft a uni-
form act regarding fraudulent conveyance law.46 The purpose was to
rectify the confusion, uncertainties and inconsistencies embodied in
existing law.47 One of the primary tasks to which the Commissioners
directed their attention was the elimination of the courts' use of pre-
sumptions regarding the debtor's intent.48 The Commissioners were
concerned that in several cases courts may have utilized the presump-
tion to an unwarranted extent.49
In 1918, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws approved the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(UFCA).50 In light of their concern regarding the courts' use of pre-
sumptions of fraudulent intent, the commissioners chose to take a bi-
furcated approach towards characterizing fraudulent conveyances. 51
Under the first approach, the notion of actual intent was retained
within the UFCA, but the Act expressly provided that the debtor's
43. Zinman, Houle & Weiss, Fraudulent Transfer According to Alden, Gross and
Borowit A Tale of Two Circuits, 39 Bus. LAw. 977, 989 (1984).
44. On certain occasions, it was not only the debtor's intentions that would be veiled
in darkness. See Hodges Brothers v. Coleman & Carroll, 76 Ala. 103 (1884) (bar-
gain sale of entire inventory consummated at nightfall).
45. Some courts presumed certain actions by the debtor, such as gifts to friends, es-
tablishment of trusts, retention of property allegedly sold to others, and bargain
sales to acquaintances, to be fraudulent transfers. See generally M. BIGELOW,
supra note 37, at 207-430 (1911).
46. UNiF. FRAUDuLENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A. 427, 427-28 (1985) (Prefatory
Note) [hereinafter UFCA].
47. Id.
48. The purposes of the UFCA were basically threefold: (1) to provide a definition of
insolvency, (2) to clearly ascertain those persons legally injured by fraudulent
transfers, and (3) to clear up problems caused by some courts' extensive use of
presumptions as to the debtor's intent in a fraudulent transfer. UFCA, supra
note 46, at 428 (Prefatory Note).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 427.
51. Compare § 7 of the UFCA, id, with §§ 4 and 5 of the UFCA, id.
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actual intent must be shown without the use of any presumption as to
that intent.52 However, in a second approach, the Commissioners set
out those transactions which could be held to constitute a fraudulent
conveyance, without any requirement of proof of actual intent.5 3 It
was considered that actions taken under certain conditions and cir-
cumstances constituted "constructive" fraudulent transfers, requiring
no proof of actual intent.
When the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was substantially revised by the
Chandler Act of 1938,54 Congress incorporated the constructive fraud
provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act into section
67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act.55 After the incorporation of these con-
structive fraud provisions, a trustee in bankruptcy could avoid fraudu-
lent transfers without proving actual fraudulent intent on the part of
the debtor.
In 1978, Congress repealed the Bankruptcy Act and replaced it
with the Bankruptcy Code.56 Section 67(d) of the Act was replaced by
section 548 of the Code; however, few substantive changes were made
in the process.57
In 1984, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code.58 At first glance,
these amendments might seem to have altered the fraudulent transfer
provisions of the Code with respect to invalidating pre-petition fore-
closure sales. However, the true impact of these amendments is un-
certain due to the lack of legislative history regarding the
amendments.59
52. Section 7 of the UFCA provides:
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual in-
tent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or
defraud either present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both pres-
ent and future creditors.
Id. at 509 (emphasis added).
53. Section 4 of the UFCA, which is directly applicable to the discussion, provides:
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred by a person who is
or will be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors with-
out regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made or the obliga-
tion is incurred without a fair consideration.
Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
54. Chandler Act Amendments of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
55. "We have condensed the provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act,
retaining its substance and, as far as possible, its language. HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d. Sess. 214 (Comm. Print
1936).
56. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
57. "This section is derived in large part from section 67d of the Bankruptcy Act. It
permits the trustee to avoid transfers by the debtor in fraud of his creditors. Its
history dates from the statute of 13 Eliz. c.5 (1570)." H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 89-90 (1978).
58. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
1 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS, 2 (98 Stat.) 333 (1984).
59. See infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of the 1984
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IV. RECENT CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
Prior to 1980, case law invalidating a non-collusive, pre-petition
foreclosure sale based on a fraudulent transfer was virtually non-exis-
tent.60 In 1980, however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals broke
new ground in the seminal case of Durrett v. Washington National
Insurance Co.,61 by invalidating a non-collusive, pre-petition foreclo-
sure sale as a fraudulent conveyance. Since the Durrett decision,
three other circuits,62 as well as numerous lower courts,63 have ren-
dered decisions with respect to this issue. As a result, a wide ranging
difference of opinion exists throughout the circuits as to the interpre-
tation and applicability of section 548(a) to pre-petition foreclosure
sales. The disagreement focuses mainly on what event constitutes a
"transfer" and the characterization of what price constitutes "reason-
ably equivalent value."
In Durrett, the debtor executed a promissory note secured by a
deed of trust. The deed of trust was executed and recorded in 1969.
Approximately eight years later the debtor defaulted, and pursuant to
amendments and the legislative history and case law surrounding these
amendments.
60. Sec. Real Prop. & Trust L., A.B.A., Report to the House of Delegates, No. 106B, at
3 (1983).
61. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
62. See In re Winshall Settler's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1985); First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Hulm (In re Hulm), 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct.
398 (1984); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 Bankr. 424
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), affd, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 125
(1984). See also Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.
1981), certdenied, 545 U.S. 1164 (1982).
63. See In re Ristich, slip op. (Bankr. E.D. Ill. 1986); In re Fargo Biltmore Motor
Hotel Corp., 49 Bankr. 782 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); In re Christian, 48 Bankr. 833
(Bankr. D. Col. 1985); In re Upham, 48 Bankr. 695 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1985); In re
Jacobsen, 48 Bankr. 497 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); In re Carr, 40 Bankr. 1007
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1984); In re Strauser, 40 Bankr. 868 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); In
re Marble, 40 Bankr. 751 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1984); In re Lakeview Inv. Group,
Inc., 40 Bankr. 449 (Bankr. E.D. N. Car. 1984); In re Frank, 39 Bankr. 166 (Bankr.
E.D. N.Y. 1984); In re Dudley, 38 Bankr. 666 (Bankr. M.D. Penn. 1984); In re
Porter, 37 Bankr. 56 (Bankr. E.D. Vir. 1984); In re Remboldt, 39 Bankr. 677 (D.
Minn. 1983), affd sub nom In re William, 39 Bankr. 678 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984);
In re Ewing, 33 Bankr. 288 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 1983), rev'd, 36 Bankr. 476 (Bankr.
W.D. Penn. 1984); In re Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818 (N.D. Ala. 1983); In re Carr, 34
Bankr. 653 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983); In re Gilmore, 31 Bankr. 615 (Bankr. E.D.
Wash. 1983); In re Berge, 33 Bankr. 642 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1983); In re Worces-
ter, 28 Bankr. 910 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983); In re Richard, 26 Bankr. 560 (Bankr. D.
R.I. 1983); In re Richardson, 23 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); In re Perdido
Bay Country Club Estates, Inc., 23 Bankr. 36 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); In re Cole-
man, 21 Bankr. 832 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982); In re Jones, 20 Bankr. 988 (Bankr.
E.D. Penn. 1982); In re Smith, 24 Bankr. 19 (Bankr. W.D. N.C. 1982); In re
Thompson, 18 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); In re Alsop, 14 Bankr. 982
(Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), alj'd, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982); In re Marshall, 15
Bankr. 738 (Bankr. W.D. N.C. 1981).
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the power of sale clause contained in the deed of trust,64 the trustee
sold the property at a foreclosure sale. The property, worth a fair
market value of $200,000, was sold to the sole bidder, a third party
purchaser, who offered the exact amount necessary to liquidate the
outstanding indebtedness, $115,400.65
Nine days later, the debtor filed a petition under Chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act.66 Acting in his capacity as debtor in possession, he
alleged that the foreclosure sale constituted a fraudulent transfer
under section 107(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act and should, therefore,
be set aside.67 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas held that the sale was not a fraudulent transfer.68
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit determined that a transfer had oc-
curred within the one year avoidance period of section 67(d) of the
Act. The court noted that even though legal title had been transferred
via the deed of trust eight years earlier, the debtor remained in posses-
sion of the property until the date of the foreclosure sale. Interpreting
"transfer" to include the debtor's surrender of possession,6 9 the court
64. A power of sale clause is basically a "contractual arrangement in a mortgage or a
deed of trust... which provides upon default or acceleration the mortgagee or the
trustee has the authority to sell the property at public sale." THE REAL EsTATE
HANDBOOK 106 (M. Seldin ed. 1980). The power of sale foreclosure is basically an
alternative to foreclosure through judicial process. This manner of foreclosure
reduces the time and expense of judicial procedures. However, the power of sale
foreclosure has been labeled as harsh and open to abuse. Jones & Ivens, Power of
Sale Foreclosure in Tennessee: A Section 1983 Trap, 51 TENN. L. REV. 279, 280
(1984).
65. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 202-03 (5th Cir. 1980).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 701-709 (1976) (repealed 1978). Chapter 11 arrangement is a proce-
dure through which business debtors seek to reorganize the distressed business
rather than to liquidate it. See Comment, Mortgage Foreclosure As Fraudulent
Conveyance: Is Judicial Foreclosure an Answer to the Durrett Problem?, 1984
WIsC. L. REV. 195, 217 n.131.
The benefits of Durrett are most apparent in reorganization cases. If
the debtor can regain substantial equity in property sold before he files
for bankruptcy, his chances of working out a successful reorganization
are increased. Even in a liquidation case, the debtor may want to set
aside a prior foreclosure sale if he prefers to see his creditors paid rather
than to allow the foreclosure sale purchaser to keep a windfall profit.
In re Richardson, 23 Bankr. 434, 447 n.19 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (quoting Note,
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Under Deed of Trust May Be a Fraudulent Transfer of
Bankrupt's Property, 47 Mo. L. REv. 345, 345 (1982)).
67. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 460 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
68. Id. at 54.
69. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing 1
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1.30 (14th ed. 1967)). The Durett court relied on the
broad definition of transfer found in section 1(30) of the Bankruptcy Act. That
definition provides:
"Transfer" shall include the sale and every other and different mode,
direct or indirect, of disposing of or of parting with property or with an
interest therein or with the possession thereof or of fixing a lien upon
property or upon an interest therein, absolutely or conditionally, volun-
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reasoned that the transfer was not finalized until the day of the fore-
closure sale.70
The focal issue addressed by the court was whether the sale price
constituted a fair equivalent for the property. The court noted that it
was not able to locate any decision in which the transfer of real prop-
erty for less than 70% of fair market value had weathered attack
under section 67(d). Since the sale price represented a mere 57.7% of
the property's fair market value, the court determined that the sale
price was not a fair equivalent for the exchange. Based upon this anal-
ysis, the court concluded that the sale constituted a fraudulent trans-
fer which should be set aside.7 1
A year later, in Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co.,72 the
Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reaffirmed the principles set out in Dur-
rett. Judge Clark, in a strong dissent,73 argued that a foreclosure sale
does not constitute a transfer by the debtor, since in such a sale there
is no voluntary conveyance by the debtor.74 He contended that the
time of the transfer for purposes of fraudulent conveyance law should
be determined by the debtor's action of executing the trust deed or
mortgage, whereby the secured party is vested with the right to en-
force the security lien. He forecast that under Durrett a cloud would
be cast on mortgages and trust deeds further depressing the prices re-
alized at foreclosure sales.75
The Fifth Circuit's interpretation and application of the fraudulent
transfer provisions of the bankruptcy laws has not gone unchallenged.
Two decisions, both out of the Ninth Circuit, best represent the major
tarily or involuntarily, by or without judicial proceedings, as a convey-
ance, sale, assignment, payment, pledge, mortgage, lien, encumbrance,
gift, security, or otherwise; the retention of a security title to property
delivered to a debtor shall be deemed a transfer suffered by such debtor;
11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1976) (repealed 1978).
As indicated, the Act was repealed in 1978. The definition found in section
1(30) of the Act was incorporated into section 101(40) of the Code, which was
later amended to be section 101(41), and thereafter amended to be section 101(48)
of the Code.
70. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980).
71. Id. at 203-04.
72. 647 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981).
73. Id. at 549 (Clark, J., dissenting).
74. Judge Clark's dissent is based on the literal wording of section 67(d), which refers
to "[e]very transfer... by a debtor." Id. at 549 (Clark, J., dissenting) (quoting 11
U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)) (emphasis added). One commentator notes that Judge Clark's
argument has been weakened by the Code, since section 548(a) refers to the
"transfer of an interest of the debtor." Henning, An Analysis of Durrett and Its
Impact on Real and Personal Property Foreclosures: Some Proposed Modifica-
tions, 63 N.C. L. REv. 257, 265 n.47 (1985) (emphasis added).
75. Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Clark, J., dissenting).
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countervailing views as to the transfer issue and the concept of reason-
ably equivalent value.
Both of the decisions from the Ninth Circuit involved the same
case, Madrid v. Del Mar Commerce Co. (In re Madrid).76 In the first
of these decisions, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel re-
viewed the concept of reasonably equivalent value (Madrid 1).77 In an
appeal from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's decision to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Panel's deci-
sion. However, it did so on the basis of the Circuit Court's determina-
tion as to the transfer issue (Madrid II).78
The facts of Madrid are fairly comparable to those of Durrett. Ma-
drid involved a non-judicial foreclosure sale of real estate. The debtor
had purchased the property in September, 1979, by borrowing the en-
tire purchase price and executing both a first and a second deed of
trust as security for the loans. When the debtor defaulted, the trustee
under the second deed of trust sold the property at foreclosure sale.
The only bidder at the foreclosure sale, a third party purchaser,
purchased the property, subject to the first deed of trust, and an
amount necessary to liquidate the indebtedness secured by the second
deed of trust.79
Seven days after the foreclosure sale, the debtor filed bankruptcy,
and as debtor in possession sought to avoid the sale under section
548(a). The bankruptcy court determined that the sale price consti-
tuted 64% to 67% of the property's fair market value. The bankruptcy
court then followed the Durrett decision and held that the sale was a
fraudulent conveyance.8 0
On appeal, in Madrid I, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed
the bankruptcy court's decision. The panel did not discuss the trans-
fer issue, but based its decision on the issue of reasonably equivalent
value. The court rejected the Durrett 70% guideline, reasoning that a
regularly conducted foreclosure sale, being open to all bidders and
creditors, is in itself protection against the evils of private transfers.8 1
The court then stated that the "law of foreclosure should be harmo-
76. 10 Bankr. 795 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Madrid v. Lawyer's Title Ins.
Corp., 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982 (Madrid 1), affd, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th
Cir. 1984) (Madrid I1), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984).
77. Madrid v. Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp., 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (Madrid
1).
78. Madrid v. Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984) (Madrid II).
79. Madrid v. Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp., 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (Madrid
1).
80. Madrid v. Del Mar Commerce Co. (In re Madrid), 10 Bankr. 795 (Bankr. D. Nev.
1981).
81. Madrid v. Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp., 21 Bankr. 424, 426-27 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982)
(Madrid 1).
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nized with the law of fraudulent conveyances."s 2 In an effort to ac-
complish this goal, the court held that any sale price received at a non-
collusive and regularly conducted foreclosure sale should be conclu-
sively presumed to be a reasonably equivalent value for the property
sold.83
On appeal, in Madrid I, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's holding; however, it did so
without addressing the issue of reasonably equivalent value. Instead,
the court focused on the issue of transfer, concluding that the foreclo-
sure sale did not constitute a transfer under Section 548(a).8 4
The court rejected Durrett's application of the broad definition of
transfer to a foreclosure sale. Instead the court focused on a narrower
definition of transfer contained in Section 548(d)(1).85 Based upon
this provision, the court stated that "a foreclosure sale is not a transfer
by a debtor,.., but rather is an involuntary conveyance triggered by
the debtor's failure to fulfill some obligation. .. ."86 The court con-
cluded that in the case at hand, a transfer occurred when the security
interest under the deed of trust was perfected under applicable state
law.87
In 1984, the Eighth Circuit had opportunity to address the matter
in First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Bismark v. Hulm (In
re Hulm).8 8 Not only was this the first time the Eighth Circuit en-
tered the controversy, but it was the first decision by a circuit court
involving the attempted avoidance of a judicial foreclosure sale.89 The
82. Id. at 427.
83. Id.
84. Madrid v. Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir. 1984) (Madrid
I).
85. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1) (Supp. II 1984). Section 548(d)(1) provides:
For the purposes of this section, a transfer is made when such transfer is
so perfected that a bona fide purchaser from the debtor against whom
applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an
interest in the property transferred that is superior to the interest in
such property of the transferee, but if such transfer is not so perfected
before the commencement of the case, such transfer is made immedi-
ately before the date of the filing of the petition.
Id.
86. Madrid v. Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1984) (Madrid
II).
87. 1.& at 1199. The Madrid II decision has been placed in doubt by certain amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984. For a fuller discussion see infra notes
109-111 and accompanying text.
88. 738 F.2d. 323 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 105 U.S. 398 (1984).
89. The Hulm case resulted from the attempted avoidance of a judicial foreclosure
sale. In analyzing the Hulm opinion for what it truly represents, it is important
to clear up a misconception held by some commentators. While judicial foreclo-
sure sales involve some type of judicial action, in some jurisdictions the judicial
foreclosure sale does not necessarily require a judicial confirmation hearing.
Contra Comment, supra note 66, at 196. In the case of North Dakota, the jurisdic-
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Eighth Circuit held that a foreclosure sale constitutes a transfer under
the Code. The court, however, refused to adopt a mathematical test
for determining the adequacy of the price received at a foreclosure
sale.90
In addressing the transfer issue, the court stated that section
548(d)(1) "only determine[s] when a transfer is deemed to occur, not
whether a certain occurrence is a transfer of an interest of the debtor
in property."91 Based on the broad definition of transfer in section
101,92 the court reasoned that a foreclosure sale constituted a transfer.
The court reasoned that there may be distinct and separate transfers
of the debtor's interests at different times; therefore, the perfection of
a security interest would constitute a transfer, while the termination
of the debtor's right to possession through foreclosure sale would con-
stitute another separate transfer of the debtor's interests. The Hulm
court indicated that section 548(d)(1) was not inconsistent with its
conclusion.93
In addressing the issue of reasonably equivalent value, Hulm's lack
of reference to Durrett is obvious. The Hulm court chose only to re-
ject the holding of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Madrid I,
where the sale price had been automatically equated with reasonably
tion in which the foreclosure action occurred, the laws of the state do not provide
for a judicial confirmation hearing, but only provide for a statutory redemption
period following the sale in which the debtor may redeem the property. See gen-
erally N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-01 to 32-19.1-07 (1976 & Supp. 1985).
It has been argued that a judicial foreclosure sale involving a judicial confir-
mation hearing should be immune from attack in bankruptcy. See generally
Comment, supra note 66. In the Hulm case, since there was not a confirmation
hearing conducted at the state level, it would seem that the judicial foreclosure
sale should not be given any more deference than a trustee's sale conducted
under the power of sale clause of a deed of trust.
Since the laws of Nebraska provide for a confirmation hearing after a judicial
foreclosure sale it is appropriate to ascertain what weight should be given a state
court judgment in the federal bankruptcy area. For a discussion of this see supra
note 157.
90. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Bismark v. Hulm, 738 F.2d 323, 326-27 (8th Cir.
1984).
91. Id. at 327.
92. The current general definition of "transfer" in the Code is found at 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(48)(Supp. II 1984), however, Hulm was decided prior to the effective date of
the 1984 amendments, so the Hulm court would have focused on the definition
found in 11 U.S.C. § 101(41)(1982).
That definition in section 101(41) provides: "'transfer' means every mode, di-
rect or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of
or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of
title as a security interest." Id.
For a fuller discussion of the change in the definition of transfer provided for
by the 1984 amendments, see infra notes 109-111 and accompany text.
93. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Bismark v. Hulm, 738 F.2d 323, 326-27 (8th Cir.
1984)
[Vol. 66:383
FORECLOSURE SALES
equivalent value. The court indicated that only through an eviden-
tiary hearing could a determination be made as to whether the sale
price constituted reasonably equivalent value and accordingly, re-
manded the case to the bankruptcy court for such a hearing.94
In April, 1985, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re Win-
shall Settlor's Trust,9 5 joined its sister circuits in ruling on the use of
the fraudulent conveyance provisions of the Code to avoid pre-petition
foreclosure sales. Although the decision did not bring any new inter-
pretations to the forefront, it is important in one respect. There had
been speculation that the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code
legislatively overruled the decision in Madrid I1 The Sixth Circuit
expressly noted that the amended language of section 548(a) did not
weaken or overrule the decision in Madrid 11.96 Accordingly, the
Sixth Circuit followed Madrid II, as well as Madrid I, stating that a
foreclosure sale could not be set aside as a fraudulent conveyance
since no transfer would occur at the time of sale and that even if the
sale were considered a transfer, the sale price would constitute reason-
ably equivalent value.9 7
While the decisions of lower courts have been important in flesh-
ing out this area of the law,98 the opinions at the circuit level have
carried the weight in this dispute. Therefore, discussions of lower
court cases will be limited to their particular applicability to the
issues.
V. THE ISSUES
A. Transfer
As case law indicates, the issue as to whether a foreclosure sale
should be characterized as a transfer for purposes of section 548(a) has
been and continues to be fiercely contested. Arguments raised by op-
posing factions focus both on the actual characterization of the event,
as well as the timing of the event.99 Case law provides support for at
least four fairly distinguishable approaches.
94. Id. at 327.
95. 758 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1985).
96. Id. at 1138-39 n.3.
97. Id.
98. See supra cases cited in note 63.
99. The timing of the event is a critical issue, since any transfer completed outside of
the one-year avoidance period provided for in section 548(a) will be immune from
attack by the trustee in bankruptcy. Usually, as the situation unfolds, the perfec-
tion of the security lien on the subject property will have occurred beyond the
one year avoidance period; therefore, if this date is deemed to be the date of trans-
fer, the transfer will be immune from attack. However, the foreclosure sale will
usually have occurred within the one-year period, and accordingly, if this date is
considered to be the date of transfer, then the sale may be subject to attack.
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The first approach is found in Durrett, where the court relied on
the broad definition of transfer set out in section 1(30) of the Act to
conclude that a foreclosure sale constituted a transfer.100 The Durrett
court articulated a view that the debtor-creditor relationship, from the
execution and perfection of the security device through the termina-
tion of the defaulting debtor's interests in the property, constituted
one transfer which was not finalized until the complete termination of
the debtor's interests in the property.1 01 In light of the Hulm decision,
it would appear reasonable that the Fifth Circuit might reclassify the
entire transaction as two or more separate transfers, a characteriza-
tion which in no way would disturb the result reached in Durrett.
A second approach taken by the bankruptcy court in In re AlsoplO2
provided that while a foreclosure sale might constitute a transfer
under section 101(48), section 548(d)(1) sets out special rules which
supersede the general definition. 08 The Alsop court would apply a
state law relation-back doctrine to find that the purchaser's title at a
foreclosure sale relates back to the date on which the security lien
being enforced is perfected under state law.10 4
A third approach, articulated in Madrid II, appears to be a hybrid
of the Alsop reasoning.105 The Madrid II court concluded that section
548(d)(1) defined a transfer as that conveyance of rights which was
made on the date when the security lien being enforced was perfected
under state law.106 The Madrid II approach varies from Alsop since
the Madrid II court actually utilized section 548(d)(1) to define the
transfer without referring to relation back theories under state law.1 07
In re Hulm presents a fourth approach. The Hulm court focused
on the broad definition of transfer found in section 101(48) and con-
cluded that in the life of any debtor-creditor relationship there may be
separate and distinct transfers of the debtor's interests.108 Accord-
ingly, the execution of a mortgage would constitute a transfer, while
the foreclosure of the debtor's interests would constitute yet another
transfer. The court's analysis in Hulm seems to approach the transfer
issue more realistically since it appears obvious that the debtor's loss
100. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980).
101. Id.
102. 14 Bankr. 982 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), affd, 22 Bankr. 1107 (D. Alaska 1982).
103. In re Alsop, 14 Bankr. 982, 986 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981).
104. Id.
105. See Castanares, Foreclosures in Bankruptcy: Are They Fraudulent Convey-
ances?, 21 IDAHo L. REV. 517, 527 (1985).
106. Madrid v. Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1199 (9th Cir. 1984) (Madrid
I!).
107. Id. at 1199 n.1 (stating that the court did not base its holding on the relation back
doctrine).
108. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Bismark v. Hulm, 738 F.2d 323, 327 (8th Cir. 1984).
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of the rights to possession should constitute some type of transfer
under modern legal principles.
In surveying the four approaches, the conflict seems to center on
whether a court chooses to use the literal language and broad defini-
tion of transfer found in section 101(48), or to instead rely on section
548(d)(1) to shift the focus of inquiry to the date the security lien was
perfected under state law. In order to better analyze the transfer is-
sue, it may be best to consolidate the four approaches into a dichotomy
of viewpoints; one best represented by Madrid II, the other by Hulm.
The validity of the Madrid II approach is uncertain because of the
1984 amendments to the Code.10 9 Congress amended sections 101(48)
and 548(a) with language which seemed to legislatively overrule Ma-
drid H1.110 While it appears that there was no intent on the part of
Congress to do so,11 ' the language remains and, therefore, presents
potential pitfalls to the courts.
109. After the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333 (1984), several com-
mentators questioned the continued validity of the Madrid II decision. See 5
DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW § 22.09[C] (1985); G. NELSON & D. WHmiAN, supra note
5, at 663; Henning, supra note 74, at 271.
110. The amendments redesignated section 101(41) as section 101(48), and added to the
language of the provision as follows:
"[Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or condi-
tional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property
or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security
interest and foreclosures of the debtor's equity of redemption;
11 U.S.C. § 101(48) (1982 & Supp. II 1984) (italicized language added by the 1984
amendments).
Section 548(a) also was amended as follows:
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or in-
curred on or within one year before the date of the filing of the petition,
if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily-[made the prohibited
transfers].
11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1983 & Supp. II 1984) (italicized language added by the 1984
amendments).
111. A discussion on the Senate floor three months after the bill containing the
amendments was passed indicates the intent of at least two senators.
Mr. DeConcini. Apparently there may have been some misunder-
standing regarding the effect of certain technical amendments made by
the recently enacted bankruptcy legislation, Public Law 98-353, specifi-
cally section 421(i), which amended the definition of transfer in the
Bankruptcy Code-11 U.S.C. section 101(48) in the new legislation-to
add the phrase "and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption,";
and section 467(a)(1), which amended section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code to add the phrase "voluntarily or involuntarily." A question has
arisen whether these amendments somehow support the position taken
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Durrett v. Washing-
ton National Insurance Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980), where the court
held that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale could be set aside in bankruptcy
if the sale price was not sufficiently high. My understanding is that
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Regardless of the 1984 amendments, the general definition of
transfer, contained in section 101(41) prior to the amendments, ap-
pears to be more than adequate to include a foreclosure sale within its
broad definition. Legislative history indicates that the definition was
intended to be as broad and expansive as possible.11 2 If Congress in-
tended such a broad approach, then it naturally follows that a foreclo-
sure sale should be considered to be a transfer.
Contrasted with this interpretation of transfer, some supporters of
the Madrid II decision base their arguments on historical perspective.
Two commentators who have reviewed the law of transfers in the
early 1900s have concluded that for the purposes of avoidance in bank-
ruptcy, the enforcement of a lien does not constitute a transfer.113 In
analyzing the cases from the Supreme Court during the early 1900s,
these commentators, Coppel and Kahn, reviewed the language con-
tained in opinions which held the enforcement of a lien not to be a
preference under bankruptcy laws. One case relied upon was Thomp-
son v. Fairbanks,114 where the Court stated, "It can scarcely be said
that the enforcement of a lien by taking possession, with consent of
the mortgagor, of after-acquired property covered by a valid mortgage
is a conveyance or transfer within the bankrupt [sic] act."11 5 Based on
statements such as this, usually found in preference cases, Coppel and
Kahn have argued that this limiting language should likewise apply to
the attempted avoidance of the enforcement of a lien on the basis of a
fraudulent transfer.116
The arguments raised by Coppel and Kahn have not gone unchal-
lenged. One challenge which seems particularly valid, is that Coppel
and Kahn have taken an unduly narrow view of the particular lan-
these provisions were not intended to have any effect one way or the
other on the so called Durrett issue. Is my understanding correct?
Mr. Dole. The Senator's understanding is indeed correct.
Mr. DeConcini. Then I am correct in concluding that parties in bank-
ruptcy proceedings who seek avoidance of prepetition foreclosure sales
would find no support for their arguments in these amendments?
Mr. Dole. The Senator's conclusion is correct.
130 Cong. Rec. 13771-13772 (98th Cong., 2d Sess., Oct. 5, 1984).
112. Congressional intent is shown in this statement:
A transfer is a disposition of an interest in property. The definition of
transfer is as broad as possible. Many of the potentially limiting words
in current law are deleted, and the language is simplified.... Under this
definition, any transfer of an interest in property is a transfer, including
a transfer of possession, custody or control even if there is no transfer of
title, because possession, custody, and control are interests in property.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 314 (1972).
113. See Coppel & Kann, Defanging Durrett. The Established Law of "Transfer", 100
BANKING L.J. 676 (1983).
114. 196 U.S. 516 (1905). See also Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U.S. 165 (1902), Sabin v. Camp,
98 F. 974 (C.C.D. Or. 1900). See generally Coppel & Kann, supra note 113.
115. Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U.S. 516, 523 (1905).
116. See generally Coppel & Kann, supra note 113.
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guage contained within the general discussions of preferences in these
opinions."T7 For instance, in Thompson, language following that relied
upon by Coppel and Kahn states, "There is no finding that ... the
mortgagor had any purpose of hindering, delaying or defrauding his
creditors.... Without a finding to the effect that there was an intent
to defraud, there was no invalid transfer of the property within the
provisions of section 67(e) of the bankruptcy law.""l8 This statement
indicates that the Supreme Court would have had little difficulty in
determining that the enforcement of a lien constituted a fraudulent
transfer if the debtor in that case had acted with intent to defraud.1"9
Another argument which has been raised in support of Madrid II is
based on the development of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances
Act.120 In the Prefatory Note, the drafters of the UFCA discussed rea-
sons for its adoption. At one point in the explanation, they state:
"There are many transfers which wrong creditors where intent to de-
fraud.., does not in fact exist. In order to avoid these conveyances,
the courts... in equity have pushed presumption of fraud as a fact to
the unwarranted extent... ."121 To avoid the use of presumptions, the
Note indicates that "[i]n the Act as drafted all possibility of a presump-
tion of law as to intent is avoided," but those "conveyances which the
courts have in practice condemned... are declared fraudulent irre-
spective of intent."'322
It appears that the drafters of the UFCA only intended to codify
those common law cases where courts had condemned conveyances
through the' use of presumptions of fraud. However, courts at that
time did not condemn non-collusive foreclosure sales.123 Therefore, it
is improbable that the drafters of the UFCA, which was later incorpo-
rated into the bankruptcy laws without substantial change, intended
the "constructive" fraud provisions found in section 4 of the UFCA to
apply to non-collusive foreclosure sales.12 4
While the preceding argument lends support to the Madrid II re-
sult, other parts of legislative history tend to support opposing
117. See Davis & Standiford, Foreclosure Sale as Fraudulent Transfer Under the
Bankruptcy Code: A Reasonable Approach to Reasonably Equivalent Value, 13
REAL EsT. L. J. 203, 222-23 n.75 (1985).
118. Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U.S. 516, 523-24 (1905).
119. Davis & Standiford, supra note 117, at 207-10.
120. See Note, Regularly Conducted Non-Collusive Mortgage Foreclosure Sales: Inap-
plicability of Section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 52 FOROHAM L. REy. 261,
266 (1983).
121. UFCA, supra note 46, at 428 (Prefatory Note).
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Pierce v. Pihrce, 16 Cal. App. 375, 383, 117 P. 580, 583 (Ct. App. 1911);
Reeves v. Miller, 121 Mich. 311, 312-13, 80 N.W. 19, 19 (1899); Magruder v. Clay-
ton, 29 S.C. 407, 410, 7 S.E. 844, 848 (1888).
124. See Note, supra note 120, at 266.
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views. 125 One of the original drafts of section 67(d) contained the fol-
lowing statement: "The provisions of [section 67(d)] ... shall be inter-
preted and construed so far as possible in uniformity with the law
wherever the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act is enacted. ' '126
This statement was deleted prior to the final passage of the bill in
1938,127 lending support to the argument that Congress desired that
the federal courts have significant leeway in the application of the
fraudulent transfer provisions of the bankruptcy laws so that justice
might best be served.128
One final argument against the Madrid II approach is its reliance
on section 548(d)(1). The provision seems designed to solve the prob-
lem of fraudulent transfers becoming impregnable to attack by keep-
ing the transfer a secret until the appropriate time limitation period
had run.129 The entire concept incorporated into timing provisions
such as a section 548(d)(1), is to postpone the running of the time limi-
tation period, not to accelerate it.130 Section 548(d)(1) should be
strictly applied for the sole purpose of "bringing a transfer... forward
into the avoidance period." 3 1
While arguments can be made that the decision reached in Madrid
II can be supported by historical perspectives, the expansive definition
of transfer and the undeniable disposition of some valuable interests
of a debtor through a foreclosure sale, which may deprive other credi-
tors of the resources of the debtor's estate, lend support to the decision
reached by the Hulm court. The courts and the commentators, how-
ever, clearly have not reached any consensus as to whether the fore-
closure sale should constitute a transfer. 32
B. Reasonably Equivalent Value
For the most part, much of the substance contained in section 67(d)
125. See id, at 268-69.
126. National Bankruptcy Conference, Analysis of H.R. 12889,74th Cong., 2d Sess., 217
(Comm. Print 1936).
127. See Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67, 52 Stat. 840, 875 (1938).
128. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY, supra note 12, at § 548.01 nn.22-26.
129. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, at § 548.08.
130. Davis & Standiford, supra note 117, at 224.
131. Henning, supra note 74, at 270.
132. Substantial support is seen in the lower court cases for the argument that a fore-
closure sale does constitute a transfer. See, e.g., In re Ryan, 48 Bankr. 833 (Bankr.
D. Col. 1985); In re Upham, 48 Bankr. 695 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1985); In re Carr, 34
Bankr. 653 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983), affd, 40 Bankr. 1007 (D. Conn. 1984); In re
Berge, 33 Bankr. 642 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1983); In re Bates, 32 Bankr. 40 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 1983); In re Worcester, 28 Bankr. 910 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983); In re
Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); In re Richard, 26 Bankr. 560
(Bankr. D. R.I. 1983); In re Richardson, 23 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); In
re Coleman, 21 Bankr. 832 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982); In re Smith, 24 Bankr. 19
(Bankr. W.D. N.C. 1982).
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of the Chandler Act, was carried over into section 548 of the Code.133
In the transition, however, the requirement of "fair consideration" in
the Act was switched to "reasonably equivalent value" in the Code.134
While this change might be considered substantial in some respects,
the change really did little to alter the ultimate decisions respecting
the avoidance of foreclosure sales as fraudulent transfers. Under the
Act, a showing of fair consideration had to include proof that (1) ade-
quate consideration was received in the exchange, and (2) the trans-
feree, the person receiving the debtor's property in exchange for
giving value, had acted in good faith.35 The drafters of the Code
chose to omit the sometimes subjective and problematic inquiry into
the transferee's good faith,136 leaving only the requirement that the
adequacy of the consideration received in the exchange be reviewed.
Since in cases such as Durrett, the parties stipulated to the trans-
feree's good faith,137 the change from "fair consideration" to "reason-
ably equivalent value" had little impact on litigation involving non-
collusive foreclosure sales.
Case law has spawned at least three distinguishable approaches to
ascertaining whether the price received at a foreclosure sale consti-
tutes adequate consideration for the property sold. The first approach,
attributed to Durrett, provides a 70% benchmark, whereby a chal-
lenged foreclosure sale will not be upheld unless the sale price consti-
tutes at least 70% of the fair market value of the property.J38 A
second approach, outlined in Madrid 1, holds that any sale price re-
ceived at a non-collusive foreclosure sale is irrebuttably presumed to
be reasonably equivalent value.139 A third approach, initially ex-
pressed in Judge Volinn's dissent to Madrid 1,140 takes the view that
the test for reasonably equivalent value should be based on the facts
and circumstances surrounding the particular case.1 41
The 70% guideline of Durrett 42 is basically a quantitative ratio for
determining the adequacy of the sale price. Under the 70% rule, if the
133. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1973) [hereinafter Commission Report].
134. Compare Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67(d)(2), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938) with 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(2) (1982).
135. Chandler Act, ch. 575 § 67(d)(1)(e), 52 Stat. 840,870 (1938). See also In re Messen-
ger, 32 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (good faith requirement on the trans-
feree). See generally Note, The New Bankruptcy Act- A Revision of Section
67d-the Death of a Dilemma, 7 HoFsTRA L. REv. 537, 540-42 (1979).
136. Commission Report, supra note 133, at 177 n.2.
137. Durrett v. Washington Nat'1 Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980).
138. Id. at 203-04.
139. Madrid v. Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp., 21 Bankr. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982)
(Madrid 1).
140. Id. (Volinn, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 428.
142. See Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980).
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sale price was not equivalent to at least 70% of the fair market value of
the property, the challenged foreclosure sale would be set aside.143
Unfortunately, the Durrett court has been besieged with unfair criti-
cism, since Durrett did not establish a per se rule. Several courts,
however, have interpreted the decision in that manner.1 44
If indeed there is a per se 70% rule in existence, both advantages
and disadvantages can be seen. One advantage is that a per se 70%
rule may provide bidders at a foreclosure sale more certainty regard-
ing whether a potential bid is likely to be upset in later proceedings.
Another consideration resounds in the language of one court. "De-
spite lip service given to . . . other factors .... in most of the cases
[there are no significant factors] except the price paid at the sale and
the fair market value of the property at that time."'145 If this is the
case, lines must be drawn at some point. Providing an easily identifi-
able guideline would perhaps lend more uniformity to case decisions
then if the determination were left merely to judicial fiat.
The major flaw of a 70% rule is quite self-evident. The inflexibility
which is accorded such a standard forecloses judicial consideration of
other facts and circumstances relevant to a particular case. As two
commentators plainly state the point, "[i]f arithmetic were to supply
the answer to the question of whether a transfer is fraudulent, Con-
gress would hardly have asked the courts to determine whether the
consideration was.., reasonably equivalent .... ,146
A second approach, outlined in Madrid I, provides that the price
received at a regularly conducted, non-collusive foreclosure sale con-
stitutes reasonably equivalent value.' 47 Only proof of some oppres-
sion, unfairness, or fraud would serve to defeat this presumption.148
The justification for such an approach is the desire for harmony be-
tween the law of foreclosure and the law of fraudulent transfers.149
This approach has attracted the notice of the National Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, who have incorporated this exact approach
into the recently approved Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.'5 0
143. See e.g., Madrid v. Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp., 21 Bankr. at 424, 426 (Bankr. 9th
1982) (Madrid 1); In re Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818, 821 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); In re
Smith, 24 Bankr. 19, 23 (Bankr. N.D. N.C. 1982); In re Jones, 20 Bankr. 988, 993
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
144. One problem inherent in any type of quantitative comparison involving real es-
tate, is that the appraisal of real estate is an inexact science, leading to varied
determinations regarding a particular property's actual fair market value.
145. In re Hulm, 45 Bankr. 523, 528 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1984) (on remand from the 8th
Circuit for an evidentiary hearing).
146. Davis & Standiford, supra note 117, at 225-26.
147. Madrid v. Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp., 21 Bankr. 424, 426 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982)
(Madrid 1).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985).
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The approach utilized in Madrid I, however, is subject to criticism.
In granting the sale price an irrebuttable presumption of adequacy,
the inquiry which section 548(a)(2) is designed to facilitate is all but
foreclosed151 and, therefore, factors which might be important to a
court are not considered at all.
The Madrid I rule has also been criticized for giving undue weight
to state foreclosure policies152 which may provide some creditors inad-
equate protection. 5 3 When property of the debtor is sold at a foreclo-
sure sale, unsecured creditors of the debtor may be disadvantaged if
the sale results in less than adequate consideration for the property
being sold. Therefore, federal courts should be able to apply federal
bankruptcy law to independently determine the adequacy of the con-
sideration received in order to make available for distribution to credi-
tors the maximum amount of debtor assets.
A third approach to determine reasonably equivalent value, seen
by some to be the optimal method, is to test the sale price in view of all
of the facts and circumstances surrounding the sale. This approach
was initially proposed by Judge Volinn in his dissenting opinion in Ma-
drid .154 The Hulm court seemed to take a similar approach in re-
jecting Madrid I and by making no reference to Durrett. The Hulm
court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of reasonably equivalent value-an issue which
that court held must be decided on a case by case basis.'55
Unlike the two approaches previously discussed, the third ap-
proach provides a court with the flexibility it may need in particular
cases to look to factors other than price. Factors which might be con-
sidered include (1) whether the sale resulted from a non-judicial or
judicial foreclosure,156 (2) whether the sale was subject to judicial con-
firmation,157 (3) whether the foreclosing lender retained any right to
151. In re Richardson, 23 Bankr. 434, 446 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
152. Id. at 447.
153. Id.
154. Madrid v. Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp., 21 Bankr. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982)
(Madrid 1) (Volinn, J., dissenting).
155. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Bismark v. Hulm, 738 F.2d 323,327 (8th Cir. 1984).
156. In most cases, judicial sales will not present foreclosing creditors with as many
opportunities for abusing the system as do nonjudicial foreclosure sales.
157. Certain arguments have been raised that a foreclosure sale which has been sub-
ject to a judicial confirmation hearing at the state level should be immune from
attack in federal bankruptcy court. See generally Comment, supra note 66. In
light of a particular Nebraska statute, NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1531 (1985), it is inter-
esting to note some of the considerations raised by this contention.
The pertinent part of the Nebraska statute states, "[Tihe court may refuse to
confirm such sale, if, in its opinion, such mortgaged premises have a fair and rea-
sonable value equal to or greater than the amount of the decree .... ." Id. Based
upon this language in the Nebraska statute, it may appear that the determination
of the court at the state level as to the adequacy of the price received at the fore-
closure sale, should preclude a trustee or the debtor in possession from challeng-
1987]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
seek a deficiency judgment against the debtor,158 (4) whether there
was competitive bidding at the sale, and (5) the actual dollar amount
differential between the sale price and the property's fair market
ing the sufficiency of the price received at the foreclosure sale. While an indepth
consideration of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article, the issues will
briefly be addressed in relation to Nebraska law.
Three courts which have dealt with this subject to a limited extent are In re
Gilmore, 31 Bankr. 615 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1983); In re Perdido Bay Country
Club Estates, Inc., 23 Bankr. 36 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); and In re Jones, 20 Bankr.
988 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982). All three cases were conducted in the context of a
reorganization in bankruptcy, and not straight liquidation. The court in Jones
held the foreclosure sale to be a fraudulent transfer but made no reference at all
to the judicial aspects of the sale. In the other two cases, both courts held the
debtor in possession was collaterally estopped from challenging the adequacy of
the price received at foreclosure sale in federal bankruptcy litigation, based upon
the opportunity which the debtor had in state court to challenge the sale.
In considering whether a state court's determination as to the adequacy of
price received at a foreclosure sale should preclude inquiry into the issue under
federal bankruptcy law, several arguments can be made that the issue should still
remain open to litigation. One argument which might be made and could be ap-
plied with equal force to a debtor in possession or to a trustee, is that the stan-
dards by which the sale price is judged may vary from state court to federal court.
Nebraska standards for review of a district court's determination of the adequacy
of the sale price are stated as follows: "Mere inadequacy of price will not pre-
clude a confirmation of a judicial sale, unless it is so inadequate as to shock the
conscience of the court or amount to evidence of fraud." Department of Banking
v. Modrow, 134 Neb. 336, 278 N.W. 559 (1938). Accord Nebraska Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Patterson, 212 Neb. 29, 321 N.W.2d 71 (1982) (order of confirmation will
not be reversed unless shocking discrepancy between value and sale price).
Based upon the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4) (1982), it
would appear that a party should not be precluded from relitigating an issue if
the party had a significantly heavier burden of persuasion in the first action. If a
challenging party were to be able to successfully show a variance in the stan-
dards, the issue of price adequacy may be reopened in federal court. Unfortu-
nately, it would appear in a review of the cases, that the lowest sale price which
was confirmed and subsequently upheld constituted approximately 70% of the
property's value. See E.H. Lougee, Inc. v. Matters, 124 Neb. 223, 246 N.W. 242
(1933). This leaves in question whether the standards may be so different as to
provide this avenue of attack on a judicially confirmed sale in Nebraska. See
Brown v. Felson, 442 U.S. 127, 139 n.10 (1979) (if a state court uses standards
identical to federal standards, then relitigation may be collaterally estopped).
Another argument that a trustee could raise, however, is that he was not a
party to the first action, and therefore should not be precluded from challenging
the adequacy of the price received at the foreclosure sale. Under the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(1) (1982), the trustee would seem to have a
good chance of litigating the matter, since he would not have been able to obtain
review of the confirmation hearing. The trustee should not be stopped by an ar-
gument that he is claiming under the debtor who might be estopped, since the
trustee would be able to attack fraudulent conveyances made with actual intent
by a debtor even though the debtor could not attack these transfers. The trustee,
attacking on behalf of creditors of the debtor's estate, should then have opportu-
nity to reopen the issue of the adequacy of the sale price.
158. If a foreclosing creditor is able to obtain a deficiency judgment against the debtor,
the debtor's estate will be depleted by even a greater amount.
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value.159
In brief, the entire issue narrows down to a choice of (1) holding
state foreclosure practices to be immune from scrutiny, or (2) allowing
federal courts the flexibility to review particular foreclosure sales to
insure that the interests of the creditors of the debtor's estate have not
been significantly harmed.
C. Policy Considerations
The controversy which surrounds the concept of avoiding foreclo-
sure sales as fraudulent transfers is not one that will be easily dis-
pelled. Most views regarding either the transfer issue or the issue of
price adequacy are supported by meritorious considerations and argu-
ments. Because of the competing arguments, the ultimate resolution
of this matter should be based upon the principle which underlies both
foreclosure law and bankruptcy law-the principle of equity. Only by
evaluating and weighing the fairness of the competing policy consider-
ations will a just resolution be found.
In reviewing the various policy considerations to be addressed in
formulating a resolution to this matter, it is insightful to return once
again to the scene of a foreclosure sale. The archaic ritual commences
once again, never really having proved its ability to achieve the high-
est sale price possible for any particular parcel of real estate.
On the steps of the courthouse stands the sheriff or a trustee, who
has probably never been formally trained in the art of auctioneering.
Various spectators and curious onlookers watch as he commences the
sale. These onlookers might have been drawn to the sale by a notice
posted at the courthouse, a notice posted on the subject property, or a
legal notice located within the bowels of a local legal publication of
limited circulation. The person conducting the sale describes the
property only by legal description, which may constitute little more
than gibberish to many laypersons. One spectator who asks whether
the property is subject to prior liens, receives only a vague reply. The
terms of settlement are simple-cash, a very uncommon and inconve-
nient form of real estate financing. During the time allocated to the
receiving of bids, the person conducting the sale receives only one bid,
that of the foreclosing lender. Calling for further bids and receiving
no response, the sheriff or trustee, as the case may be, declares the
sale closed and the property sold to the only bidder.
In light of this forced-sale environment, federal courts have inter-
vened only in those situations in which the inadequacy of the price
159. If a property's value is only $10,000 and it sells for $6,800, should this be compared
with a property having a value of $1,000,000 and selling for only $680,000? Both
ratios of sale price to value equal 68%, however, there is a substantial difference
in the amount of depletion in the respective debtors' estates.
1987]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
received at the sale was so low under the circumstances that the sale
constituted a constructively fraudulent transfer. The federal courts,
under bankruptcy laws, are protecting the interests of the debtor and/
or the interests of creditors of the debtor's estate, which otherwise
may go unprotected from an estate-depleting transfer.
Opposing policy considerations can be raised, one of which is the
concern that in avoiding foreclosure sales, courts will cast a cloud on
the title of real estate purchased at foreclosure sales. This is certainly
a valid concern. However, it should be noted that in almost one-half of
the states, under certain forms of foreclosure, statutory redemption
periods already exist which produce the same result.16o
Another consideration is that the cloud that may be created on ti-
tles will reduce competitive bidding at foreclosure sales. In actuality,
under today's present system, the vast majority of foreclosure sales
are also provided with certain protections under sections 548(c) and
550 of the Code.16 1
Concern might also be raised that the avoidance of foreclosure
sales would wreak havoc on the credit markets, increasing the cost of
credit and reducing the amount of credit available to particular con-
sumers. It would appear true that as financial institutions tailored
loans to meet the new risks foreseen, the amount of credit available to
real estate purchasers with minimal resources would be reduced,
thereby cutting potential purchases out of the real estate market. In
fact, however, the amount of equity a purchaser has in any parcel of
real estate may very well be correlated to the likelihood of the pur-
chaser's not defaulting in payments on the loan covering the property.
The ultimate result would not be a destabilizing result, but instead, a
stabilizing outcome.
Ultimately, any proposed solution would seem to require certain
tradeoffs. While there is an interest in upholding foreclosure proce-
dures, it appears that most state legislatures have postponed needed
reforms. And in light of the Machiavellian foreclosure procedures
sanctioned by existing laws, court decisions avoiding foreclosure sales
as fraudulent transfers are probably appropriate and probably also
serve an important impetus in moving state legislatures toward re-
forms of state foreclosure procedures.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING STATE
FORECLOSURE PRACTICES
It is clearly not realistic or practical to require that foreclosure
sales realize prices equivalent to those received in lengthy, fully nego-
tiated transactions where both parties are at liberty to terminate the
160. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, at 616.
161. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(c), 550 (1982).
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negotiations. The distress factor involved in a foreclosure sale undeni-
ably places a certain amount of downward pressure on the ultimate
sale price. However, regardless of the inherent downward pressure on
the price, certain changes in foreclosure procedures would serve to
avoid ridiculously low bargain-sale prices.
Probably one of the two greatest inadequacies of foreclosure proce-
dures is the lack of sufficient advertising reasonably calculated to at-
tract and encourage potential bidders. Generally, statutorily
mandated advertising and notice requirements are limited to (1) the
posting of the property, (2) a legal notice of the upcoming foreclosure
sale posted in the courthouse, and/or (3) a legal notice imbedded in a
local publication. Usually the property is described only by legal de-
scription, in a very generic legal notice and, consequently, does not
serve the function of attracting large numbers of laypeople as poten-
tial bidders.
One step in reforming the foreclosure process would be to require
foreclosing parties to advertise the property to be sold in a manner
comparable to methods employed by other sellers of real estate. Such
advertising might include a description of the property in laymen's
terms and possibly a photo of the property if the real estate included a
structure. The advertisement might be placed in a weekend edition of
a paper of general circulation in order to reach as many people as
possible.
A second, and complementary approach toward increasing visibil-
ity might include some type of multiple listing arrangement with local
realty companies. The property would receive exposure prior to the
sale and local realty companies would receive some nominal consider-
ation for the exposure service they provided. If the arrangement was
not suitable to realty companies, perhaps simple published brochures
describing upcoming foreclosure sales and the properties involved
could be placed at strategic locations, such as banks and other finan-
cial institutions throughout a county, for distribution to the public.
Probably the second greatest deficiency of the foreclosure process
is the terms of payment for purchased properties. Normally, the sale
price must be paid in cash very shortly after the completion of the
sale. Since realty is seldom transferred without some financing in-
volved, the short-fused payment period very often takes most poten-
tial buyers out of the market.
In order to alleviate this problem, several steps should be taken to
accommodate those potential buyers who would utilize financing from
local financial institutions to complete the deal. To facilitate such fi-
nancing, the foreclosing entity should be required to prepare a title
report and make that report available to potential bidders prior to the
sale date. By doing so, potential bidders, and their lenders, are alerted
to any liens on the property superior to that of the foreclosing entity.
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This would provide the certainty of title necessary to a lender in pro-
viding a tailored loan commitment to a potential purchaser prior to
the sale.
The arrangements for payment of the sale price should provide the
successful bidder with a reasonable period of time to finalize any fi-
nancing arrangements. The consummation of the deal could then be
scheduled at a time and place agreeable to the parties, and conducted
in a manner similar to the closings of most real estate transfers.
Other modifications of the foreclosure procedure would be
designed to alter the environment of the sale. One recommended
change would be to relocate the sale from the courthouse steps to a
location such as an assembly room or unoccupied courtroom, providing
fewer distractions and less of an air of entertaining spectacle. Another
recommended change would be to replace the normally stoic and sub-
dued person conducting the sale with a person having some training in
the art of auctioneering, for the purpose of actively soliciting bids.
While these proposals are in no way exhaustive of the potential
modifications of foreclosure procedures, they demonstrate the ease
with which existing foreclosure procedures can be improved. By at-
tacking the adequacy of prices received under current methods of
foreclosure, courts in cases such as Durrett and Hulm have merely
reinforced basic instincts as to the overall shortcomings of current
foreclosure practices. Only through decisions such as these, will state
legislatures be prodded toward reforming current foreclosure
procedures.
Michael L. Walcott '86
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